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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LaVAR \Y. THATCHER, Administrator 
of the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, 
deceased, ELL~\ IVORY LIVINGSTON, 
GENIEL L. THATCHER, RUBY 
LIVINGSTON, an incmnpetent, by Ella 
Ivory Livingston, her guardian ad litem, 
LESLIE L. WRIGHT, DAVID HALL 
LIVINGSTON, an infant, by Ella Ivory 
Livingston, his guardian ad litem, 
Appellants, 
-vs.-
ISABELLE MERRIAM, EDWIN N. 
ROBERSTON, Administrator of the j 
Estate of Lillian Robertson, deceased, 
and ELLEN COOK, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CASE NO. 
7689 
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of 
respondents Isabelle Merriam, Edwin N. Robertson, 
Administrator of the Estate of Lillian Robertson, de-
ceased, and Ellen Cook, arid against all the appellants, 
by which it was determined that the respondents were 
the owners and holders of a Promissory Note dated 
November 1, 1947, in the sum of $70,476.92 executed by 
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defendant L. DeW ayne Merriam, payable to the order 
of Joseph F. Livingston, and that said respondents were 
also the owners and holders of a Deed of Trust and 
Chattel Mortgage which were executed and delivered 
by defendant L. DeWayne Merriam to secure the pay-
ment of said Promissory Note, and which judgment also 
determined that none of the appellants had or ever had 
any right, title, claim, or interest in or to said Promissory 
Note or in the indebtedness represented thereby or in 
said Deed of Trust or Chattel Mortgage securing the 
payment of said Promissory Note (R-30). One of the 
original defendants in the action was L. DeW ayne Mer-
riam. He was served with Summons, but did not appear 
and his default was entered. He was the maker of the 
Promissory Note, Chattel Mortgage, and Deed of Trust. 
Said L. DeW ayne Merriam is taking no part in this ap-
peal. The pages of the record will hereafter be referred 
to in parenthesis with no other designation. 
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS 
This action was one commenced in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County by the administrator of the Estate 
of Joseph F. Livingston, deceased, and the heirs of said 
decedent to have declared void and of no force and effect 
a certain instrument designated "Assignment," dated 
March 27, 1948, by which Joseph F. Livingston during his 
lifetime attempted to make a gift of an obligation owed 
to him by Lorin DeW ayne Merriam, to three sisters of 
said Joseph F. Livingston; namely, Isabelle Merriam, 
Lillian Robertson, and Ellen Cook (1-3). 
Lorin DeW ayne Merriam is the same person as L. 
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DeW ayne Merriam and his first name is incorrectly 
spelled in the transcript of the testimony "Lauren." 
The case was tried before the Honorable Ray Van 
Cott, Jr., without a jury on March 9, 1951. 
The respondents in their original Answer did not set 
forth any clain1 to the Promissory Note, Chattel Mort-
gage, and Deed of Trust, nor did they disclose upon what 
theory they claimed to be the owners of said instruments. 
However, at the close of the evidence, upon request of 
counsel for appellants, counsel for respondents stated 
that he claimed there was a gift of the note and the mort-
gages securing it by virtue of the execution and delivery 
by the deceased of the Assignment (92). Counsel for 
respondents at that time also amended the prayer of 
the Answer "to include such further relief as the defend-
ants are entitled to and particularly that it be adjudged 
and determined that the three defendants are the owners 
of the note and the mortgages securing the payment of 
the note, which note is referred to in the Complaint and 
which was introduced in evidence." 
The obligation of Lorin DeW ayne Merriam was 
evidenced by a Promissory Note dated November 1, 1945, 
signed by him, originally for the sum of $94,577.00, pay-
able ten years after date in annual installments com-
mencing November 1, 1946, with interest thereon at the 
rate of 6% per annum from date, payable annually (Ex-
hibit E). The payment of the obligation was secured by 
a Deed of Trust dated April29, 1946, covering 5,260 acres 
of real property situated in Rio Blanco and Moffat 
Counties, State of Colorado, which was signed by Lorin 
De Wayne Merriam (Exhibit B), and by a Chattel Mort-
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gage dated April29, 1946, which was also signed by Lorin 
DeWayne Merriam (Exhibit C). The Chattel Mortgage 
was on 3,141 head of sheep then located at Scenery Gulch, 
west of Meeker, Colorado, and other personal property 
. (Exhibit G). 
On November 1, 194 7, another Promissory Note was 
executed and delivered to Joseph Franklin Livingston by 
Lorin DeWayne Merriam for the sum of $70,476.92, 
payable on or before ten years after date with interest 
at the rate of 5% per annum from date thereof (Exhibit 
D), in which it was provided that the Note was secured 
by Deeds of Trust on lands in Moffat and Rio Blanco 
Counties, Colorado, and by Chattel Mortgage on certain 
sheep. The Note also provided that the maker agreed to 
pay annually toward the obligation any and all net 
profits realized from the operation of the mortgaged 
sheep. This Note was apparently a renewal of the earlier 
Note for $94,577.00 (41). This Note shows by indorse-
ment in handwriting of one, A. H. Anderson, under date 
of November 1, 1948, that interest was paid to date and 
$5,476.92 was paid on the principal, leaving a balance on 
the Note of $65,000.00 (38). Joseph F. Livingston died on 
April 14, 1948. A short time before his death, according 
to the testimony of Lester Cook, and Mrs. Isabelle Mer-
riam, Joseph F. Livingston executed and delivered the 
Assignment, Exhibit A. The instrument bears date of 
March 27, 1948, and appears to have been acknowledged 
on the same day before a Notary Public. According to 
Mrs. Isabelle Merriam, who did not attend the trial, but 
whose testimony was read from a deposition, the Assign-
ment was delivered by Joseph F. Livingston to Isabelle 
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.J[errianl and her two sisters, l\f r~. Cook and l\lrs. Robert-
son, while at the hon1e of 1\[r. and Mrs. Cook (7-l- ). Mrs. 
~Ierrian1 believed that it was delivered on l\1 areh 26, 
19-lS (76). Lester Cook also testified that he saw the 
Assignment first on :Jiarch 26, 1948 (54). The te~timony 
of :Jir. Cook (56) and l\Irs. ~lerriam (77) is to the effect 
that the Assignment was taken to aN otary Public for the 
signature of the Notary Public without Joseph F. Living-
ston being present (56), and without his personal ac-
knowledgement. 
Neither the Promissory Note dated November 1, 
1945, Exhibit E, (58-59), nor the Promissory Note dated 
November 1, 1947, Exhibit D, (37, 58, 62, 81), nor the 
Deed of Trust, Exhibit B (59), nor the Chattel Mortgage 
( 61), a photostatic copy of which was prepared by the 
County Recorder of Rio Blanco County, Colorado, Ex-
hibit C, was delivered to the said three sisters of Joseph 
F. Livingston, or to anyone on their behalf by Joseph 
F. Livingston, or by anyone on his behalf during the life-
time of Joseph F. Livingston (58-59). The Chattel Mort-
gage had been filed in the office of the County Recorder 
of Rio Blanco County, Colorado, on June 7, 1946 (Exhibit 
C) and apparently remained on file there. The Deed of 
Trust, Exhibit B, was filed for record in the office of 
the County Recorder of Rio Blanco County, Colorado, 
on June 7, 1946, and was apparently returned to Joseph 
F. Livingston, and found by LaVar W. Thatcher among 
the papers of Mr. Livingston the day after his death 
(35). LaVar W. Thatcher also testified that he found the 
copy of the Chattel Mortgage, Exihibt C, and the Promis-
sory Note, Exhibit D, among the papers of Mr. Living-
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ston the day after his death (37). Mr. Thatcher found 
the Promissory Note, Exhibit E, after the death of Mr. 
A. H. Anderson, who was the manager of the sheep oper-
ations for the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, deceased, 
(59-60) among the papers belonging to the Livingston 
Estate in Mr. Anderson's desk (40-41). Mr. Anderson 
died in August, 1950 ( 40). Mr. Cook testified that he had 
the photostatic copy of the Chattel Mortgage, Exhibit 
C, made (60) after the death of Mr. Livingston (61). 
The Assignment, Exhibit A, was recorded in the 
office of the County Recorder of Rio Blanco County, 
Colorado, on April 30, 1948, 16 days after the death of 
Joseph F. Livingston. It was apparently recorded at the 
request of DeW ayne Merriam whose name appears, to-
gether with his address, on the cover of the document 
(Exhibit A). 
The Assignment, Exhibit A, contained the follow-
ing provisions in regard to the Assignment of the Deed 
of Trust and the Promissory Note: 
"* * * provided, however, that the under-
signed assignor hereby reserves unto himself dur-
ing his lifetime all amounts becoming due on the 
principal of said promissory note and all amounts 
in excess of the amounts periodically becoming 
due thereon which the maker thereof under the 
terms of said note may choose to pay on said prin-
cipal during the lifetime of the assignor herein; 
the interest on said principal amount to be paid 
as said interest shall accrue, to the assignees 
herein in the percentages hereinabove reserved, 
i.e., 50% of said interest accruing to be paid to 
said Isabelle Merriam, 25% of said interest accru-
ing to be paid to said Lillian Robertson, and 25o/o 
of said interest accruing to be paid to said Ellen 
Cook, the undersigned hereby authorizing the 
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maker of said note and nwrtgage to make pay-
ment of the amounts herein assigned to the per-
sons nmned in the percentages herein mentioned 
• * *" (Exhibit A, Pages 1 & 2) (4 & 5) (26 & 27). 
The Assignment, Exhibit A, also contained the fol-
lowing provision in regard to the assignment of the 
Chattel ~Iortgage and the Note securing the same: 
"* • • being subject to the same terms and 
conditions as hereinabove set forth, to-wit: reserv-
ing unto the assignor herein during his lifetime 
all amounts becoming due on the principal of said 
note and all amounts in excess of the amounts 
periodically becoming due thereon which the 
maker thereof under the terms of said note may 
choose to pay on said principal during the lifetime 
of the assignor herein, the interest on said princi-
pal amount to be paid as said interest shall accrue, 
to the assignees herein in the percentages here-
inabove reserved, i.e., 50% of said interest accru-
ing to be paid to said Isabelle Mirriam, 25% of 
said interest accruing to be paid to said Lillian 
· Robertson, and 25% of said interest accruing to 
be paid to said Ellen Cook, the undersigned here-
by authorizing the maker of said note and chattel 
mortgage to make payment of the amounts herein 
assigned to the persons named in the percentages 
hereinabove mentioned." (Exhibit A, Pages 2 & 
3) (5 & 6) (27 & 28). 
There is no evidence that Lorin DeW ayne Merriam 
was at any time prior to the death of Joseph F. Living-
ston notified by him of the purported assignment. 
Lester Cook, who is one and the same person as 
W. L. Cook, after the death of Joseph F. Livingston, 
was on August 30, 1948, given a general power of at-
torney to act for Isabelle Merriam, Lillian Robertson, 
and Ellen Cook (Exhibit F) (47 & 83). 
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The evidence in the case consisted of the testimony 
of three witnesses and Exhibits A to F inclusive. The 
witnesses were LaVar W. Thatcher (34 to 42), the Ad-
ministrator of the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, de-
ceased, one of the appellants who was the only witness 
for the plaintiffs; and Lester Cook ( 44 to 62 and 82 to 
90), who is the husband of one of the respondents, Ellen 
Cook, and the attorney in fact for Ellen Cook and Isabelle 
Merriam, and who was the attorney in fact for Lillian 
Robertson prior to her death; and Isabelle L. Merriam, 
whose deposition was read into the record (62 to 81). 
Mrs. Merriam is one of the respondents. Mr. Cook and 
Mrs. Merriam were the only witnesses for the defendants. 
The plaintiffs made objection to Mrs. Merriam becoming 
a witness for the respondents because her testimony was 
concerning statements by or transactions with Joseph 
F. Livingston, or matters of fact which must have been 
equally within the knowledge of the witness and Joseph 
F. Livingston, it being claimed by appellants that Mrs. 
Merriam was prohibited from being a witness by the 
terms of Section 104-49-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, (62, 63 & 64). 
At the close of the trial in the District Court, the 
original Exhibits D and E, being the Promissory Notes, 
were by stipulation of the parties withdrawn and photo-
static copies thereof were substituted. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
Appellants intend to rely upon the following points 
for a reversal of the judgment of the Court below: 
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POINT I. 
Since by the instrument, designated Assignment, 
Exhibit A, relied on by respondents as creating a gift, 
Joseph F. Livingston retained during his lifetime present 
and future dominion over the subject of the purported gift, 
the attempted gift failed, and it was error for the Court to 
find that all of the right, title, and interest of Josepb F. 
Livingston in and to the Promissory Note, Exhibit D; the 
Deed of Trust, Exhibit B; and the Chattel Mortgage, a 
copy of which is Exhibit C; were assigned to respondents, 
Isabelle Merriam and Ellen Cook and Lillian Robertson, and 
to render judgment that the defendants Isabelle Merriam, 
Edwin N. Robertson, Administrator of the Estate of Lillian 
Robertson, deceased, and Ellen Cook, are the owners of 
the Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage. 
POINT D. 
Since the Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel 
Mortgage were all retained by Joseph F. Livingston and not 
delivered to Isabelle Merriam, Ellen Cook, or Lillian Robert-
son, and the Promissory Note was not endorsed by Joseph 
F. Livingston, it was error for the Court to find that, by the 
purported Assignment, all of the right, title, and interest 
of Joseph F. Livingston in and to the Promissory Note, 
Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage referred to in said 
Assignment were assigned to defendants Isabelle Merriam 
and Ellen Cook and Lillian Robertson, and to render judg-
ment that defendants Isabelle Merriam, Edwin N. Robert-
son, Administrator of the Estate of Lillian Robertson, de-
ceased, and Ellen Cook are the owners of the Promissory 
Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage. 
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POINT III. 
It was error for the Court to permit Isabelle Merriam 
to be a witness and to testify in violation of Section 104-
49-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
Since by the instrument, designated Assignment, 
Exhibit A, relied on by respondents as creating a gift, 
Joseph F. Livingston retained during his lifetime present 
and future dominion over the subject of the purported gift, 
the attempted gift failed, and it was error for the Court to 
find that all of the right, title, and interest of Joseph F. 
Livingston in and to the Promissory Note, Exhibit D; the 
Deed of Trust, Exhibit B; and the Chattel Mortgage, a 
copy of which is Exhibit C; were assigned to respondents, 
Isabelle Merriam and Ellen Cook and Lillian Robertson, and 
to render judgment that the defendants Isabelle Merriam, 
Edwin N. Robertson, Administrator of the Estate of Lillian 
Robertson, deceased, and Ellen Cook, are the owners of 
the Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage. 
The subject of the claimed gift is divisible into two 
parts, the principal of the obligation and the interest 
thereon. The argument on Point I will apply only to 
the principal of the obligation, and will not apply to the 
interest thereon. We do not particularly urge that the 
purported gift of the interest was ineffective because of 
retention of dominion over and control of the same, how· 
ever, we rely on the other points herein to reverse the 
judgment of the lower court in that regard. 
10 
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A valid gift inter vivos must have no reference to 
the future and must go into i1nmediate and absolute 
effect. The donor must be divested of and the donee 
invested with the right of property in the subject of the 
gift. It nmst be absolute, irrevocable, and without refer-
ence to its taking place at some future time. The donor 
must deliver the property and part with all present and 
future dominion over it. 
The above statement is supported by the following 
citations: Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, et al. (1912) 
41 Utah 3-10, 12-1 Pac. 765; In Re Romney's Estate (1922) 
60 Utah 173, 207 Pac. 139; Peterson v. Weiner (Texas 
1934) 71 SW 2d. 554; Stevenson v. Earl65 N.J. Eq. 721, 
55 Atl. 1091, 103 Am. St. Rep. 790, 1 Ann. Cas. 49; Young 
v. Young 80 N.Y. 437,36 Am. Rep. 634; Basket v. Hassell 
107 U. S. 602, 27 L. Ed. 500, 2 Sup. Ct. R. 415, 28 C. J. 
Gifts, Sections 5, 15, 21, 23, and 41, 12 R.C.L. 931. 
Joseph F. Livingston reserved unto himself during 
his lifetime the absolute right to the principal of the 
obligation, not only to the amounts becoming due, but 
also to any excess which the maker of the note might 
choose to pay. The Note was payable on or before ten 
years after date and could have been paid in full at any 
time. This reservation was a complete dominion over 
the principal of the gift. No part of the principal was 
given to the purported donees. Mr. Livingston, the day 
after the execution of the Assignment, could have re-
ceived the entire principal due on the obligation if Lorin 
DeWayne 1\ferriam decided to pay off the obligation. 
Only the death of Mr. Livingston prevented him from 
collecting the principal amount of the obligation. The 
11 
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attempted gift of the principal, therefore, could have no 
effect in praesenti but could only take effect upon the 
death of Mr. Livingston. The most that can be urged 
regarding the principal of the obligation is that it was 
an attempt to Inake a gift of the amount remaining un-
paid on the principal, if any, at the death of Mr. Living-
ston. In other words, there was an attempt to make a 
gift effective upon death of Mr. Livingston of the amount 
remaining unpaid at the time of his death, which attempt 
is testamentary in character and the instrument creating 
it not being executed with the formalities of a Will is, 
therefore, void. 
"A gift of property to take effect after the 
donor's death, the donor in the meanwhile re-
taining the control and dominion of the property, 
cannot be sustained. Such gifts are in contra-
vention of the Statutes governing the testamen-
tary disposition of property. It is not necessary 
that the condition that the property shall not pass 
until the death of the donor be expressly stated, 
in order to invalidate the gift as one inter vivos, 
it being sufficient if the condition is implied. On 
the other hand, if the gift is absolute, the mere 
postponement of the enjoyment until the death of 
the donor is not material and will not defeat it." 
28 C. J. Gifts, Section 43. 
Appellants are aware of the line of cases which hold 
that a gift of an obligation retaining the income or 
interest for life is under certain conditions valid. It is 
our contention, however, that the instant case is clearly 
distinguishable from those cases. In the line of cases 
referred to the donor has divested himself of all control 
over the principal which was the subject of the gift and 
retained unto himself only the income or interest on the 
12 
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obligation. The donor in those cases divested himself 
of all power to defeat the gift during his lifetime. The 
subject of the gift was placed beyond the donor's power 
and control, and there was nothing that the donor could 
do in regard to the principal of the obligation. In this 
case Mr. Livingston retained all control over the princi-
pal and could do with it as he saw fit. He retained with-
in his power the right to defeat the gift of the principal 
so that the gift was not absolute and immediately effec-
tive. 
In the case of Peterson v. Weiner, supra, there is 
a good discussion on the subject of retention and control 
over a note, and it was there held that where the payee 
of a note, who attempted to make a gift of it, retained 
and collected payments thereon until his death, he could 
not make a valid gift of the balance due on the note with-
out making a Will. The court stated on Page 546 of 71 
sw 2d.: 
"Regardless of this proposition, however, he 
undoubtedly had the right to collect and use the 
monthly installments and to this extent had do-
minion over the note, and only his death could 
defeat his perfect right to use both the principal 
and interest of the note. There could be no gift 
of any part of the note or the debt which the note 
represented, so long as Eaton had such dominion 
of the same, and such power to defeat the entire 
gift. 
"It is true that a person may retain a life 
estate in property and convey the remainder 
to another, but under such circumstances the 
grantor only has the use of the property, and 
cannot otherwise dispose of the property. It has 
been held that one may give money to another, but 
require the payment of interest during his life-
13 
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time, but this is not inconsistent with the idea 
that he has parted with the title to the principal. 
"We conclude that Joseph Eaton did not part 
with the absolute title of the indebtedness evi-
denced by the note and that he retained dominion 
over the same in that he had a right to collect and 
spend as he saw fit not only the interest, but the 
principal provided for in the note, and this right 
could only be questioned by his dying before all 
the payments became due." 
The above case is strikingly in point with the instant 
case and it and the other authorities cited support our 
contention that Joseph F. Livingston retained such do-
minion over and control of the principal of the purported 
gift as to defeat it. We are not aware of any case where 
the donor has retained such control of and dominion over 
the purported gift, as retained by Mr. Livingston in the 
instant case, where the court has held that there was a 
valid gift. 
In the instant case, although the administrator of 
the estate of, and the heirs of Joseph F. Livingston were 
the plaintiffs, the persons who sought to prove a gift 
were the supposed donees of the gift, they being Isabelle 
Merriam and Ellen Cook, and Edwin N. Robertson, Ad-
ministrator of the Estate of Lillian Robertson, deceased. 
The last three were defendants in the action, but they 
had the burden to establish all of the facts essential to 
the validity of the gift by clear and convincing proof. 
There seems to be no conflict in the authorities on this 
point and in support of our position we cite the following 
cases: Holman v. Deseret Savings Bank, et. al, 41 Utah 
340, 124 Pac. 765; Bowline v. Cox 26 So. 2d. 574; Storr 
v. Storr, 69 NE 2d. 916; Re Hamilton's Estate (Wash. 
14 
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1946) 174 Pac. :2d. 301; and In Re Scherzinger's Estate 
74 N.Y.S. 2d. 756. 
POINT II. 
Since the Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel 
Mortgage were all retained by Joseph F. Livingston and not 
delivered to Isabelle Merriam, Ellen Cook, or Lillian Robert-
son, and the Promissory Note was not indorsed by Joseph 
F. Livingston, it was error for the Court to find that, by the 
purported Assignment, all of the right, title, and interest 
of Joseph F. Livingston in and to the Promissory Note, 
Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage referred to in said 
Assignment were assigned to defendants Isabelle Merriam 
and Ellen Cook and Lillian Robertson, and to render judg-
ment that defendants Isabelle Merriam, Edwin N. Robert-
son, Administrator of the Estate of Lillian Robertson, de-
ceased, and Ellen Cook are the owners of the Promissory 
Note, Deed of Trust, and Chattel Mortgage. 
In 25 A.L.R. Pages 642 to 685 appears a lengthy 
and comprehensive annotation on the subject "Delivery 
of bond or note of third persons by way of gift." Section 
(g) of said annotation deals with "delivery by separate 
writing," Pages 662 to 665. It appears that courts of 
other states have held both ways on the question of 
whether a note can be given by a separate writing and by 
the donor retaining possession of the note. We have 
found no Utah case on the subject. There is also a Sec-
tion (e) in said annotation, Pages 659 to 661 on the 
subject "Necessity for Indorsement." The cases there 
cited are from other states and none from Utah, and 
some support the validity of a gift by delivery of the 
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instrument merely, without indorsement or other writing, 
while others hold that the gift failed for lack of indorse-
ment and delivery. A significant fact, however, is that 
no case is set forth in the annotation which holds that 
there is a valid gift of a note or other instrument where 
the note or other instrument has been retained by the 
person who attempted to make the gift, where the note 
was not endorsed and where the person attempting the 
gift has retained dominion and control, over the subject 
of the gift, during his lifetime. 
In discussing the case of Young v. Young, 80 N.Y. 
422, 36 Am. Rep. 634, the following appears in the anno-
tation commencing on Page 675: 
"In Young v. Young, N.Y., supra, there was 
held to be no valid gift of bonds where the owner, 
intending to give them to his son, indorsed upon 
the envelope containing the bonds memoranda in-
dicating such ownership, followed by a statement 
that the interest was to belong to him as long as 
he lived, but where there was no actual delivery 
from the donor to the donee. The court, after 
stating the general rule applicable to gifts, says 
that the first question is whether a gift of an 
instrument securing the payment of money can 
be made in praesenti, reserving to the donor the 
accruing interest. Answering this question, the 
court says : 'I can conceive of but one way in 
which this is possible, and that is by an absolute 
delivery of the security which is the subject of the 
gift to the donee, vesting the entire legal title 
and possession in him on his undertaking to ac-
count to the donor for the interest which he may 
collect thereon. But if the donor retains the in-
strument under his control, though he do so 
merely for the purpose of collecting the interest, 
there is an absence of the complete delivery which 
16 
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is absolutely essential to the validity of a gift. 
A gift cannot be 1nade by creating a joint posses-
sion of donor and donee, even though the in-
tention be that each shall have an interest in the 
chattel, especially where, as in this case, the line 
of division between these interests is not ascer-
tainable. The reservation of the interest on the 
bonds to the donor was for an uncertain period-
that is, during his lifetime and until his death; it 
was impossible to determine the precise propor-
tion of the money secured by the bonds, to which 
the donee was entitled. If, therefore, the donor 
retained the custody of the bonds for the purpose 
of collecting the accruing interest, or even if they 
were placed in the joint custody or possession of 
himself and the donee, there was no sufficient de-
livery to constitute a gift. But if an absolute de-
livery of the bonds to the donee with intent to pass 
the title was made out, the donor reserving only 
the right to look to the donee for interest, the 
transaction may be sustained as an executed 
gift.'" 
.Another exhaustive annotation on the question of 
the necessity for delivery in effectuating a gift is found 
in 63 .A.L.R. 537. This annotation discusses the question 
as to whether or not a gift may be effectively made by 
the execution of a formal instrument, such as an Assign-
ment, without the actual delivery of the subject of the 
gift. The annotation frankly concludes that on this 
question there is a division of authority, some cases hold-
ing the delivery of the Assignment to be sufficient, others 
reaching a contrary result. It is noted, however, that in 
most of the cases supporting the proposition that a gift 
can be effectuated by the execution and delivery of a 
formal instrument, the actual delivery of the subject 
of the gift was impracticable. Several cases are cited 
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where the "donor" attempted to effect a gift of items 
of personal property such as horses and cattle (Gordon 
v. Young 10 Kentucky Law Reports 681), piano and other 
furniture (In Re Fenton 182 Iowa 346, 165 NW 463) 
and money that was secreted in a hidden cache in the 
corner of a brickyard (Sylvain v. Page 276 Pac. 16, 63 
A.L.R. 528). Appellants have no quarrel with the re-
sults reached in the cases where the delivery of the 
subject matter of the gift would be impracticable. How-
ever, the annotation referred to lists a considerable 
number of cases which hold that the mere execution and 
delivery of a formal instrument without delivering the 
subject of the gift is insufficient. Included in this line 
of cases are several where the purported gift involved 
is a promissory note. 
In the case of Allen-West Commision Company v. 
Grumbles 63 C.C.A. 401, 129 Fed. 287, a husband exe-
cuted a written Assignment in the form of a bill of sale 
transferring to his wife all of his interest in a corpora-
tion of which he was a stockholder. He retained the 
stock certificates in his own possession, left his stock 
in his own name, voted the stock and received the divi-
dends therefrom. After becoming insolvent he trans-
ferred the certificates to his wife by indorsement, and by 
surrender of the certificates to her without referring 
to the previous assignment. In an action brought by 
husband's creditors, the court stated: 
"* * * It is true that in cases where manual 
delivery of the subject of the gift, or of the evi-
dences which command it, is impracticable or im-
possible, and in cases in which a written convey-
ance is the most effectual mode of devesting the 
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donor of dmninion and control of the thing, such 
a conveyance is sufficient. But it is equally true 
that a written assignment is utterly inadequate, 
where the delivery of the subject of the gift or of 
the delivery of the evidences of it is practicable, 
and the latter is the more ready and efficient way 
of commanding the dominion and control of the 
subject of the gift." 
Although the question before the court was whether 
the written Assignment was valid as against creditors 
of the husband, it was undoubtedly the court's opinion 
from the language used in the case that even as between 
the donor and donee, the Assignment was ineffective. 
In the case of Cox v. Hill, 6 Md. 274, a "donor" exe-
cuted a writing reciting that in consideration of love and 
affection, he assigned and paid over to "donee" a certain 
debt represented by a note, reserving to the donor the 
interest during her natural life. This writing was de-
livered to donee, but there was no delivery of the note. 
The court held that there was no completed gift where 
the note was retained by the donor. 
It appears to appellants that our Utah Statute, Sec-
tion 61-1-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, has some 
bearing on the problem before the court. This St~tute 
is as follows: 
"Section 61-1-31. What Constitutes Negotiation. 
"An instrument is negotiated when it is trans-
ferred from one person to another in such manner 
as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof. 
If payable to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery; 
if payable to order, it is negotiated by the indorse-
ment of the holder completed by delivery." 
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The Note in the instant case was payable to the 
order of Joseph Franklin Livingston, also known as 
Joseph F. Livingston, so our Statute was not complied 
with either by indorsement or by delivery. 
In the instant case the intended gift, if in fact one 
was intended, was not the "Assignment" but was rather 
the "Note" itself. It was the item of value. But Joseph 
Livingston did not part with its possession nor did he 
resort to the simple device of indorsing the note to the 
"donees." Rather, he elected to hold the subject matter 
of the alleged gift in his own possession and under his 
own control. By so doing, it is submitted he did not make 
an effective delivery thereof. 
POINT III. 
It was error for the Court to permit Isabelle Merriam 
to be a witness and to testify in violation of Section 104-
49-2 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
Isabelle Merriam by her deposition was permitted 
to be a witness over objection of appellants, concerning 
the purported delivery of Assignment and to testify 
about statements made by Joseph F. Livingston and 
other matters of fact equally within her knowledge, and 
that of the deceased Joseph F. Livingston. This was in 
direct violation of Section 104-49-2 (3), Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, which is as follows: 
"104-49-2. Who May Not Be Witnesses. 
"The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
"(3) A party to any civil action, suit or 
proceeding, and any person directly interested in 
the event thereof, and any person from, through 
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deriYes hi~ interest or title or any part thereof, 
when the adverse party in such action, suit, or 
proceeding claims or oppose~, sue~, or defends, 
as guardian of an insane or incompetent person, 
or as the executor or adn1inistrator, heir, legatee, 
or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian, 
assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such 
heir, legatee or devisee, as to any statement by, 
or transaction with, such deceased, insane, or in-
competent person, or matter of fact whatever, 
which must have been equally within the knowl-
edge of both the witness and such insane, incom-
petent or deceased person, unless such witness is 
called to testify thereto by such adverse party so 
claiming or opposing, suing, or defending, in such 
action, suit or proceeding." 
There can be no question concerning the parties in 
this case being covered by the provisions of the Statute. 
Mrs. ~Ierriam, the witness, was a party to the action. 
The adverse parties were the administrator and heirs 
of the deceased person. 
There can also be no question but that Mrs. Merriam 
was a witness as to statements by, transactions with, and 
matter of fact, which must have been equally within the 
knowledge of both herself and Joseph F. Livingston. 
Mrs. Merriam was not called to testify by the ad-
verse party, but was a witness for herself and her co-
defendants. 
The respondents in the court below took the position 
that since La Var W. Thatcher, one of the appellants, 
was placed on the witness stand and testified, appellants 
thereby waived objections to the competency of Mrs. 
Merriam to testify. 
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Mr. Thatcher testified that he first saw the instru-
Inent, designated as Assignment, Exhibit A, at Mrs. 
Cook's home on Preston Avenue on the occasion of the 
taking of the deposition of Mrs. Merriam, about three 
weeks before the trial (35). The trial was on March 9, 
1951. The deposition of Mrs. Merriam was taken on 
~f arch 15, 1951. Mr. Thatcher also testified about the 
finding of the Deed of Trust, Exhibit B (35), the day 
after Mr. Livingston's death in Mr. Livingston's home; 
that he took it to Mr. Anderson's home, and later to Mr. 
N eslen's office, and later it was given to Mr. Anderson 
to deliver to Mr. Cook. He identified the signatures of 
Lorin (misspelled in the record Lauren) DeWayne Mer-
riam, and of A. H. Anderson on Exhibit B. He also testi-
fied about the finding of the photostatic copy of the Chat-
tel Mortgage, Exhibit C, among the papers of Mr. Living-
ston the day after Mr. Livingston's death (37). Also Mr. 
Thatcher testified about finding the ·Note for $70,476.92, 
Exhibit D, in the same place (37) and that he handled 
Exhibits C and Din the same manner as Exhibit B. He 
also testified about finding the Note for $94,957.00, 
Exhibit E, among the papers belonging to the Estate 
of Joseph F. Livingston in the desk of A. H. Anderson 
the day after the death of Mr. Anderson in August, 1950, 
( 40 & 41). Although some statutes so provide (58 Am. 
Jur., Witnesses, Section 357, Page 210), Section 104-49-
2 ( 3), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, does not remove the 
disqualification of an adverse witness when a protected 
party offers testimony. 
Even in states where the statute provides in effect 
that the prohibition shall not extend to a transaction or 
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communication with a deceased to which a protected 
person is examined on his own behalf, the waiver does 
not apply where the protected person does not testify 
to any fact he was not at liberty to testify to without 
making an election under the Statute. 58 Am. Jur., 
Witnesses, Sec 357, Page 210. ~Ir. Thatcher did not 
testify concerning any statement made by Mr. Living-
ston on or about March 27, 1948, nor concerning the sup-
posed delivery of the instrument designated Assignment. 
Several Utah case have construed our Statute. Max-
field v. Sainsbury (1946) 110 Utah 280, 172 Pac. 2d. 123, 
is one of the recent cases, and it was decided in that case 
that the witness to be disqualified must be one whose in-
terests are against the estate of the deceased where the 
representative of the estate objects to the witnesses 
testifying. Certainly in the present case before the 
court, the interests of Mrs. Merriam was adverse to those 
of the estate because she was seeking part of the assets 
of the estate. In the Maxfield v. Sainsbury case, supra, 
Justice Wolfe, in an opinion (concurring specially), 
makes a comprehensive analysis of the Statutes as to 
what persons are disqualified thereunder from testifying. 
Mrs. Merriam certainly is included among the persons 
who by our Statute may not be witnesses and may not 
testify adversely to the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, 
deceased, as to statements by Joseph F. Livingston and 
to matters of fact which were equally within the knowl-
edge of both Mr. Livingston and Mrs. Merriam. There 
can be no serious doubt but that the trial court committed 
error in permitting Mrs. Merriam to testify. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because Joseph F. Livingston retained control of 
and dominion over the principal of the obligation, part of 
the subject of the claimed gift, the claimed gift of the 
principal of the obligation failed. The judgment of the 
lower court should be reversed as to the principal of the 
obligation and it should be determined that the principal 
of the obligation is and always has been part of the assets 
of the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, deceased. 
Because there was no delivery of the Promissory 
Note and no indorsement of it, the claimed gift, includ-
ing the interest on the obligation, failed and it should be 
determined that the interest, as well as the principal 
of the obligation,, is, and always has been, a part of the 
assets of the Estate of Joseph F. Livingston, deceased. 
The trial court erred in permitting Isabelle Merriam 
to be a witness and to testify as she did. 
For the reasons cited, appellants submit that all the 
points urged are meritorious and that th~ judgment of 
the lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EVANS, NESLEN, MANGUM 
& MORRIS, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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